

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

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GENDER: Male

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PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2014–2015 MRes in Economics, London School of Economics
2013–2014 MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics
2010–2013 BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, University of Oxford

DOCTORAL STUDIES: London School of Economics

DATES: 2015–2019

THESIS TITLE: “Essays on Auctions, Mechanism Design, and Repeated Games”

COMPLETION DATE: October 2019

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory
Secondary Fields: Behavioural Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2018–2020 EC441: Microeconomics for MRes Students
2019–2020 EC411: MSc Microeconomics
2017–2019 EC400: Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics
2016–2019 EC310: Behavioural Economics
2015–2016 EC102: Introductory Economics

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2016–2017 Research Assistant for Professor Erik Eyster
2016 Research Assistant for Professor Gilat Levy and Professor Ronny Razin

HONOURS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIP:

2014–2018 PhD Studentship, London School of Economics
2014 Ely Devons Prize, London School of Economics
2013 Hicks and Webb Medley Prize, University of Oxford

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

“Rent Extraction with Information Acquisition”

This paper revisits the classic mechanism design question of when buyers with private information in an auction setting can expect to receive economic rents. It is well known that under standard assumptions, the seller can fully extract rent for generic prior distributions over the valuations of the buyers. However, a crucial assumption underlying this result is that the buyers are not able to acquire any additional information about each other. This assumption can be seen as a special case of a general model where buyers have access to some information acquisition technology. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information acquisition technology for the seller to be able to guarantee full rent extraction, and we show that the set of information acquisition technologies where these conditions are satisfied is small in a topological sense.

Other Papers:

“Private and Common Value Auctions with Ambiguity over Correlation,” with Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 184 (2019)

We analyse auctions when individuals have ambiguity over the joint information structures generating the valuations and signals of players. We analyse how two standard auction effects interact with the ambiguity of bidders over correlation structures. First, a “competition effect” arises when different beliefs about the correlation between bidders’ valuations imply different likelihoods of facing competitive bids. Second, a “winner’s value effect” arises when different beliefs imply different inferences about the winner’s value. In the private values case, only the first effect exists and this implies that the distribution of bids first order stochastically dominates the distribution of bids in the absence of ambiguity. In common value auctions both effects exist and we show that compared to the canonical model, both in the first-price and second-price auctions, these effects combine to imply that the seller’s revenue decreases with ambiguity (in contrast with the private values case). We then characterise the optimal auction in both the private and common value cases. A novel feature that arises in the optimal mechanism in the common values case is that the seller only partially insures the high type against ambiguity.

“A Nash Threats Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Local Monitoring”

This paper characterises the equilibrium payoff set of a repeated game with local interaction and local monitoring. A sequentially rational Nash threats folk theorem holds without any restrictions on the network structure when players are arbitrarily patient, i.e. any feasible payoff above the Nash equilibrium point can be approximated arbitrarily well in sequential equilibrium. No form of communication or coordination device is required. When players discount the future, the folk theorem cannot hold unless further restrictions are made either on payoffs or the network structure.